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Far-right discourse as legitimacy? Analysing political rhetoric on 
the “migration issue” in Greece




This article advances research on the normalisation of far-right rhetoric on the “migration issue” by ana-
lysing statements from the current Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, and the ruling political party 
New Democracy political figures. Having presented the discourse-historical approach (DHA) from critical 
discourse studies (CDS) as a suitable theory and method of analysis of political discourses, I use an argu-
mentative-based DHA approach and add the argumentative schemes of Aristotelian topoi and fallacies to 
explore how the leadership of the conservative New Democracy government adopted far-right rhetoric on 
the refugee issue to justify its tough political agenda on security, law, and order. In particular, I focus on 
the representation of migration as a threat to national security and public health, the politics of hate, and 
theories of securitisation via an in-depth analysis of the current and former prime ministers’ discourses, 
the former government spokesman’s statement on the refugee issue and a popular journalist and New 
Democracy’s MP television interview, and intend to illustrate how extreme right rhetoric could serve the 
conservative New Democracy’s political strategies.
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1 Introduction
The refugee issue has dominated the 
Greek political scene since 2015 and was 
highlighted as one of the main issues of 
the conservative New Democracy’s elec-
tion campaign in July 2019. In a polarised 
climate, New Democracy accused the rad-
ical left Syriza of cultivating a welcoming 
culture for migrants in Greece; and the 
leader of the conservative party, Kyriakos 
Mitsotakis, promised to reduce migration 
by deporting thousands of asylum seekers 
living on Greek islands back to Turkey. In 
October 2019, a few weeks after Kyriakos 
Mitsotakis’ victory in a snap national elec-
tion, the new conservative government 
presented its agenda for the refugee issue, 
which revealed its xenophobic views (Liv-
itsanos, 2019). Deportations, the opening 
of detention centres, enhancement of bor-
ders security, and tougher asylum laws that 
reduce the safeguards for people seeking 
international protection synthesise the 
new government’s policy. The new migra-
tion policy challenges the humanitarian 
dimension that the Syriza government 
(2015–2019) had attempted to include 
in its policy during the refugee crisis in 
2015, in contrast to the “closed borders” 
and “blame gaming” strategies that had 
been adopted by other European govern-
ments (Boukala & Dimitrakopoulou, 2018, 
p. 183). One of the main points of the new 
government’s policy was the closure of the 
Ministry of Migration and the transfer of 
its responsibilities to the Ministry of Citi-
zens Protection, which is affiliated to the 
police and related services; a strategy ac-
companied by the law-and-order dogma 
that characterises the new conservative 
government. Moreover, the New Democ-
racy government adopted a new narrative, 
insofar as Kyriakos Mitsotakis empha-
sised that Greece faces “a migration prob-
lem and not a refugee issue” (Mitsotakis, 
2019),1 a view shared by Makis Voridis and 
1 All the extracts which appear in this article 
have been translated into English by the au-
thor.
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Adonis Georgiadis, former extreme-right 
figures who currently serve in the govern-
ment as ministers and usually refer to mi-
grants who arrive in Greece as illegal (Bou-
kala, 2021). In this article, I emphasise New 
Democracy’s far-right tradition, which has 
resurged due to the electoral rise of the left 
since 2012, and present the party’s move 
to extreme rhetoric through the prism of 
the conservative government’s migration 
policy. In what follows, I first briefly re-
view the political terrain in Greece, from 
the transition to democracy in 1974 to the 
election of the radical left Syriza in 2015, 
and especially the role of the extreme right 
and its links to the conservative party, New 
Democracy. In a second step, I present 
the discourse-historical approach (DHA) 
from critical discourse studies (CDS) as a 
suitable method to analyse, understand, 
and explain the intricate historical and 
ideological complexities of Greek political 
discourse. In particular, I introduce a DHA 
approach to the concepts of Aristotelian 
topoi, fallacies and argumentation strat-
egies (Boukala, 2016, 2019) with which 
I show how extreme-right rhetoric has 
been revived and legitimised by the New 
Democracy party, and shaped Kyriakos 
Mitsotakis’ government’s migration policy 
on the basis of national security and pub-
lic health. In other words, drawing on the 
theory of securitisation and the concept 
of sovereignty, this article explicates the 
mainstreaming of extreme-right discourse 
through the prism of the migration issue, 
which, since 2015 and the then escalation 
of the refugee crisis, has been a battlefield 
for European politics and led to the rise of 
right-wing extremism. 
2 New Democracy’s ideological 
transformation in the Greek 
political spectrum – From 
Metapolitefsi to the refugee crisis
The Greek political system that emerged 
after the transition to democracy (Meta-
politefsi) in 1974 has been characterised 
by a two-party system. The parties that 
dominated were the Panhellenic Social-
ist Movement (PASOK) that developed a 
socialist pole in Greece and the conserva-
tive New Democracy that among others 
brought together ex-army officers, ex-jun-
ta officials and anti-communists (Boukala, 
2021; Nikolakopoulos, 2005; Vernardakis, 
2011).
The results of the two 2012 national 
elections led to the meltdown of tradi-
tional political power, while the radical 
left coalition, Syriza, thrust itself to the 
forefront of the political stage – an elec-
toral rise that was sealed by the 2015 elec-
tion victory of Syriza and the formation 
of Tsipras’ coalition government. The rise 
of the radical left has been described as a 
result of the delegitimation of the polit-
ical system, which developed under the 
impact of Greek socio-political instability 
and the sovereign debt crisis (Boukala & 
Dimitrakopoulou, 2017; Verney, 2014). The 
political transformation in Greece was also 
marked by the entry of the Neo-Nazi party 
Golden Dawn into the Greek government 
and the legitimation of the extreme right 
in the Greek political spectrum, through 
the participation of the far-right Popular 
Orthodox Rally (LAOS) in the cabinet of 
Lucas Papademos2 (2011–2012). Anoth-
er important dimension of the political 
climate of that era was the resurgence of 
historical dichotomies expressed by a po-
larising political rhetoric of New Democ-
racy’s political figures (Boukala, 2014). In 
the next paragraphs, I briefly present the 
ideological roots of the New Democracy 
party and its links to far-right extremism, 
which were revived as the party’s current 
leaderships focused on a nationalist, xen-
ophobic and anti-communist agenda as a 
political strategy against the electoral rise 
of the left (Boukala, 2021). 
In particular, New Democracy’s ide-
ological base remained vague from its 
establishment in 1974 as the party inte-
grated a branch of the pro-junta far-right, 
and during the next decades was extended 
from authoritarianism to neoliberalism. 
2 Lucas Papademos was the former vice pres-
ident of the European Central Bank, who 
served as prime minister of Greece in the 
emergency government following the col-
lapse of PASOK government in November 
2011.
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According to Vernardakis (2005, pp. 102–
103), the political character of the party 
has been shaped by three different peri-
ods: Konstantinos Karamanlis’ radical lib-
eralism (1974–1981), the far-right period 
of Evangelos Averoff (1981–1984) and the 
neoliberal period of Konstantinos Mitso-
takis (1984–1993). Although ideological 
divergences marked New Democracy’s dif-
ferent leaderships in the 1970s and 1980s, 
the party developed a traditional right 
ideological tag, in contrast to the other 
political pole of the two-party system, the 
socialist PASOK. New Democracy experi-
enced a political transformation under Ko-
stas Karamanlis’ leadership (1997–2009), 
as he attempted to lead the party towards 
centrism by focusing on middle-ground 
politics (Vernardakis, 2011) and removing 
the “curse” of the far-right from the party; 
a political move that led to the resurgence 
of the far-right as an autonomous ideo-
logical pole and the creation of the LAOS. 
Antonis Samaras’ leadership (2009–2015), 
accompanied by the Greek debt crisis, led 
to the revival of the far-right within New 
Democracy and in Greece in general. Po-
litical figures of the Greek far-right who 
were in the forefront during the period 
of nationalist fervour in the 1990s, due to 
the conflict between Greece and the then 
FYROM – today North Macedonia, over 
the name Macedonia and Greece’s north-
ern neighbour’s claim to it, joined Lucas 
Papademos’ coalition government (2011–
2012) and thereafter the conservative New 
Democracy party under Antonis Samaras’ 
leadership (Boukala, 2021). The same fig-
ures had also presumed upon the then 
migration issue in the 1990s, the unlimit-
ed arrival of Eastern European immigrants 
together with the lack of a coherent immi-
gration policy, and communicated their 
nationalist and xenophobic views from 
the front stage politics during the refugee 
crisis in 2015 (Boukala, 2021).
Here, I would like to introduce two 
significant political figures that move their 
political views through the political main-
stream far from the far-right’s sidelines. 
Firstly, Makis Voridis, founder and presi-
dent of the far-right Hellenic Front party – a 
political party that was characterised by its 
resemblance with Le Pen’s National Front, 
supporter of the nouvelle droite,3 current 
Minister of the Interior, former Minister of 
Rural Development (2019–2020), Minister 
of Health (2014) and Minister of Transport 
and Networks (2012–2014) in the coalition 
government under the presidency of Lucas 
Papademos (2011–2012). Secondly, Adonis 
Georgiadis, current Minister of Devel-
opment and Investments, vice president 
of New Democracy and former Minister 
of Health (2013–2014), who was also ap-
pointed Deputy Minister of Development 
in the coalition government of Lucas Pa-
pademos.
The political heritage of the Greek far-
right that was based on anti-communism 
and ideological dichotomies, established 
during the white terror against pro-com-
munist and leftist civilians by the national 
guard militaries and paramilitaries (1945–
1946) and the Greek civil war (1946–1949) 
(Panourgia, 2009), had become main-
stream insofar as Samaras’ New Democ-
racy adopted an extreme rhetoric devel-
oped under the mantle of nationalism and 
protection of the Greek nation against the 
Syriza “red menace” and the refugee cri-
sis (Boukala, 2021). In this vein, New De-
mocracy’s extreme right tradition that was 
slowly forgotten as the party embraced the 
centre, was revived in parallel with divided 
memories of the past.
In January 2016, the current Greek 
prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, was 
elected president of New Democracy. In 
contrast to Antonis Samaras’ nationalist 
and polarised agenda, Mitsotakis’ election 
to the party leadership was considered an-
ti-populist, neoliberal and EU-oriented. 
However, Kyriakos Mitsotakis soon revived 
the party’s far-right tradition by nominat-
ing Makis Voridis and Antonis Georgiadis 
as spokesmen for the party and cultivat-
ing polarisation and ideological enmity 
between right and left (Boukala, 2021). 
Security became the main issue of his po-
3 By the concept of nouvelle droite I refer to 
the French intellectual movement that de-
veloped in the late 1960s, which shaped the 
ideological roots of the extreme right and 
was created in opposition to the political 
heritage of the left (Bar-On, 2011). 
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litical agenda and a terrain of political jux-
taposition that illustrated the regularity of 
the far-right turn of the party. Migration 
and the emergence of the refugee crisis 
(2015–2016) became the number one issue 
of national security and was discussed on 
the basis of a far-right rhetoric that reveals 
the normalisation of the extreme right in 
the Greek political spectrum, as I attempt 
to show in the next sections analysing po-
litical discourse. 
3 Methodology: Synthesising 
critical discourse analysis and 
argumentation
According to Norman Fairclough (1993, 
p. 64) discourse could be considered a 
“practice not just of representing the 
world, but of signifying the world, con-
stituting and constructing the world in 
meaning”. By utilising the term discourse, 
Fairclough underlines the relation be-
tween language and society. In this way, 
he explicates that discourse contributes 
to the construction of social identities, so-
cial relationships and beliefs of a society’s 
functions, given that practices are partly 
discursive and also discursively repre-
sented. Different approaches to critical 
discourse studies (CDS) underline this 
coexistence, and the discourse-historical 
approach (DHA) especially considers dis-
course to be “context-dependent semiotic 
practices, as well as socially constituted 
and socially constitutive, related to a mi-
cro-topic and pluri-perspective” (Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2009, p. 89). Hence, the DHA can 
reveal the links between discursive prac-
tices, social variables, institutional frames 
and socio-political and historical contexts. 
For this reason, the DHA is a useful theo-
ry and method with which to analyse and 
explain the complexities, and historical 
and ideological dichotomies employed in 
Greek political discourse. 
As Reisigl and Wodak (2001) further ex-
plain, the DHA employs three dimensions 
of analysis. These are: the specific contents 
or topics of specific discourses; discursive 
strategies; and the linguistic means that 
are used to disclose both topics and strat-
egies (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). Five types of 
discursive strategies are involved in con-
struing a positive Self and negative Other 
presentation and explicating the main lin-
guistic and pragmatic elements, rhetor-
ical tropes, and argumentative schemes 
that establish the discursive opposition 
between “Us” and “Them”-referential or 
“nomination”, “predication”, “argumen-
tation”, “perspectivisation”, and “intensi-
fication or mitigation” (Reisigl & Wodak, 
2016, p. 33). In this chapter, I emphasise 
referential or nomination strategies, which 
highlight the representation of social ac-
tors via the usage of linguistic tropes such 
as metaphors. I also focus on predication 
strategies which shed light on the discur-
sive characterisation of social actors. Fi-
nally, I emphasise argumentation strate-
gies through which positive and negative 
attributions of social actors are justified 
and legitimised (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, 
2016). According to Reisigl and Wodak 
(2001, 2016) the DHA is distinguished from 
other schools of critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) mainly due to its emphasis on argu-
mentative schemes. Thus, here I intend to 
contribute to the discussion on the rela-
tion between the DHA and argumentation 
by synthesising the DHA and the Aristote-
lian thought. The concepts of Aristotelian 
topoi and fallacies are the main argumen-
tative tools of the DHA and ensure an in-
depth analysis of the fallacious arguments 
usually employed by politicians in their 
rhetoric (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, 2016), 
and these can allow a holistic study of the 
fallacious reasoning and strategies of po-
litical communication employed by New 
Democracy’s political figures. Topoi are 
integrated into the area of dialectic, which 
Aristotle calls endoxon (see also Rigotti & 
Greco, 2019). Endoxon refers to a previ-
ous, commonly accepted opinion, whose 
validity is examined by dialectic syllogism. 
According to Aristotle (1992), topoi are 
search formulas that examine endoxon, or 
common knowledge, and comprise falla-
cious reasoning. Aristotle uses the concept 
of endoxon to describe an opinion that can 
be accepted by the majority of people be-
cause it represents traditional knowledge. 
As he further explains, dialectic topoi are 
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the means and places for the development 
of dialectic syllogisms; they are the means 
by which a dialectician verifies endoxa and 
solves a dialectic problem through predi-
cables, while topoi in Rhetoric (Aristotle, 
2004) are a means of persuasion.
In Rhetoric, Aristotle (2004, B23) cat-
egorises the topoi that apply to all sub-
jects / topics in common and can be used 
to explain general arguments that are not 
referred to specific situations. Rubinelli 
(2009, p. 84) has noted that the above to-
poi are “argument schemes, they are all 
devices for arriving at a certain conclusion 
about a case”. As Boukala (2019) also ex-
plains, these topoi can be applied to every 
rhetorical case, while they do not all have 
universal applicability. Aristotle (2004, 
B23) provides a holistic classification of 
topoi that can be used by interlocutors to 
persuade an audience (though they might 
be named differently) of their argument. 
For this reason, topoi can be useful in a 
systematic analysis of various discourses. 
Aristotle also distinguishes between “topoi 
of probative / real enthymemes” and “to-
poi of fallacious enthymemes”; and, as he 
explicates, via a number of examples, topoi 
are usually expressed by the proposition 
“if one, then the other” (Boukala, 2019; 
Reisigl & Wodak, 2016). Thus, topoi have a 
main role in the analysis of argumentation 
and the formation of argumentation strat-
egies. Moreover, fallacious arguments are 
widely adopted in prejudiced and discrim-
inatory discourse (Boukala, 2016; Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2016; Rigotti & Greco, 2019).
Aristotle (1994, 164a 19–21) also de-
fines fallacies by explaining that they are 
“arguments that appear to be logical ref-
utations, but in fact they are not; they are 
fallacies (paralogisms)”. Thereafter, Aris-
totle provides a systematic classification 
of fallacies that seem to be diachronic, in-
sofar as they can be re-used for the coher-
ence of current political argumentation 
and can also contribute to the recognition 
of fallacies that dominate contemporary 
political discourse. Various scholars and 
disciplines have focused on fallacies as a 
means to serve the justification of discrim-
ination and binary oppositions (Reisigl & 
Wodak, 2001). In particular, the study of 
fallacies, like the study of topoi, holds an 
important place in argumentation theo-
ry, Pragma-dialectics and the DHA. Van 
Eemeren and Grootendorst (1987) devel-
oped a set of norms for the identification 
of fallacies and the development of a crit-
ical discussion of false reasoning. Hence, 
an argumentative tactic that violates any 
of the rules below is evaluated as falla-
cious. These rules can be summarised as 
follows:
1. Parties must not prevent each other 
from advancing or casting doubt on 
standpoints.
2. Whoever advances a standpoint is 
obliged to defend it if asked to do so.
3. An attack on a standpoint must relate 
to the standpoint that has already been 
advanced by the protagonist.
4. A standpoint may be defended only by 
advancing argumentation relating to 
that standpoint.
5. A person can be held to the premises 
he leaves implicit.
6. A standpoint must be regarded as con-
clusively defended if the defence takes 
place by means of arguments belong-
ing to the common starting point.
7. A standpoint must be regarded as con-
clusively defended if the defence takes 
place by means of arguments in which 
a commonly accepted scheme of argu-
mentation is correctly applied.
8. The argument used in a discursive text 
must be valid or capable of being val-
idated by the explicitization of one or 
more unexpressed premises.
9. A failed defence must result in the pro-
tagonist withdrawing his standpoint 
and a successful defence must result in 
the antagonist withdrawing his doubt 
about the standpoint.
10. Formulations must be neither puz-
zlingly vague nor confusingly ambig-
uous and must be interpreted as ac-
curately as possible (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1987, p. 284–292).
As van Eemeren, Garssen and Meuffels 
(2009) further elucidate, if any of the above 
norms are violated, we are no longer deal-
ing with topoi, but with fallacies. Fallacies 
are analysed in Pragma-dialectics “as dis-
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cussion moves which threaten the resolu-
tion of a dispute; they are violations of the 
rules of critical discussion” (van Eemeren & 
Grootendorst, 1987, p. 297). The DHA also 
serves to emphasise fallacies and false rea-
soning. As Reisigl and Wodak (2001, 2016) 
note, the line between reasonable and fal-
lacious argumentation cannot be drawn 
clearly in any case. Based on this observa-
tion, I would argue that the introduction of 
a DHA-informed systematic analysis of the 
Aristotelian tradition can contribute to an 
in-depth study of those arguments, which 
reveals the correlation between the far-
right and right-wing. Furthermore, it em-
phasises historical dichotomies that dom-
inated the Greek political scene, and still 
do. In the next section, I examine the above 
hypothesis by analysing political speeches 
and statements of the current and former 
prime ministers – Kyriakos Mitsotakis and 
Antonis Samaras respectively, as well as 
the Greek government spokesman, Stelios 
Petsas’ statements and New Democracy 
MP, Konstantinos Bogdanos’ television in-
terview on the migration issue by utilising 
the three DHA discursive strategies men-
tioned above and focusing on topoi and 
false reasoning. 
4 Analysis: The discursive construc-
tion of the threat of migration
New Democracy’s national congress took 
place in Athens in November 2019, after 
the party’s electoral success and the for-
mation of Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ cabinet. 
During the congress, the current president 
and prime minister of Greece, and former 
presidents of the party, had the opportuni-
ty to discuss New Democracy’s principles 
and the new government’s political agen-
da. The former president of the party and 
prime minister of Greece, Antonis Sama-
ras, underlined the migration issue. As he 
mentioned in his speech (Samaras, 2019): 
We should respect the refugees and offer 
them hospitality and protection. Asia Minor 
refugees that arrived in Greece in 1922 did not 
invade the country. Moreover, Greek immi-
grants did not illegally enter the countries in 
which they arrived. In Greece we have a ma-
jority of illegal migrants. We are talking about 
illegal invaders, mainly from countries where 
there is no war or other conditions that would 
justify providing them asylum. Our country is 
under an informal illegal colonisation. Illegal 
migration is also a threat to European coun-
tries and the European Union. 
Samaras juxtaposes the Greek refugees 
who arrived in Greece after the Minor Asia 
catastrophe in 1922 and the current refu-
gees who “invade the country”. In this way, 
he cultivates an antithesis that is amplified 
through continuous references to “illegal 
migrants / migration” and the neologism 
“illegal invaders” (Stamatinis, Archakis, & 
Tsakona, 2021). Based on homonymy that 
according to Aristotle is a dialectical tool 
that examines the relation between dif-
ferent concepts (2004, B23,1401a) or ar-
gumentum ad hominem,4 Samaras (2019) 
stigmatises refugees as illegal and invad-
ers. Hence, refugees and threat become 
synonymous via a fallacy of homonymy5 
that violates logical validity (rule 8) and 
a correct reference to implicit premises 
(rule 5). Furthermore, the former prime 
minister cultivates a climate of fear via a 
synthesis of the fallacious topos of hyper-
bole6 and the topos of the consequential,7 
that here could be labelled the topos of the 
threat of migration and paraphrased as “if 
migration threatens Greece and Europe, 
then the new Greek government should 
stop it”. Hence, Samaras legitimises tough 
migration policies by presenting the refu-
gee issue as a threat to national security. 
4 “A verbal attack on the antagonist’s personal-
ity and character that based on homonymy” 
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 72).
5 Two things are homonymous when they are 
called by the same name but have different 
definitions (Aristotle, 1994, 165b). 
6 A fallacious topos that illustrates how the or-
ator construct an argument via hyperboles 
(Aristotle, 2004, B23, 1401a).
7 A topos that shows how the argument is 
used in order to urge or prevent someone of 
doing something. As Aristotle claims (2004, 
B23, 1399a) if an act has both good and 
bad consequences, then on the basis of the 
good / bad consequences it can be exhort-
ed / blamed (Boukala, 2019).
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The nationalist views of the former 
prime minister and the polarised rhetoric 
that New Democracy adopted under his 
leadership revealed the party’s deep right-
wing roots that remained obscure. There-
after, under Samaras’ governance and its 
contribution to the normalisation of far-
right discourse, New Democracy MPs of 
different generations and political statuses 
openly presented opinions remote from 
the party’s centrist character. A charac-
teristic example of the legitimation of ex-
treme right-wing views within the party is 
Konstantinos Bogdanos’ references to the 
refugee issue during a television interview 
on 23 November 2019 (To BHMAteam, 
2019) when he commented that:
Refugees should stay on deserted islands, 
we cannot forever be tormented by certain 
taboos or certain sorts of post-civil war or 
post-dictatorship complexes. Deserted is-
lands are the right place where refugees can 
be hospitalised … Refugees cannot have the 
same rights as the Greek people.
Here, Bogdanos revives haunting memo-
ries of the Greek civil war and dictatorship 
by referring to deserted islands where left-
ists were exiled and tortured. He attempts 
to deconstruct the importance that the 
Greek left have applied to these islands 
and, in parallel, to validate the exclusion of 
migrants on the basis of argumentum ad 
baculum, a fallacy that as Reisigl and Wo-
dak (2001, p. 71) further explain, “serves 
the discrimination of the antagonist by 
threatening the antagonist with negative 
sanctions”. In other words, an argument 
that violates rules 1 and 4 and serves the 
far-right audience’s expectations. The 
same argument was adopted by the leader 
of the extreme right party Hellenic Solu-
tion, Kyriakos Velopoulos (2019, November 
5), who declared that “Greek authorities 
have to move migrants to deserted islands 
… they are illegal”. Bogdanos and Velopou-
los, however, should not claim devising the 
above proposition, which seems to belong 
to Georgios Karatzaferis, the LAOS’ lead-
er who has already proposed that “illegal 
immigrants should be transported to Mak-
ronisos islands” in his 2012 election cam-
paign (Newsroom iefimerida, 2012). Mak-
ronisos is one of the main islands used as 
political prisons and places of torture for 
many leftists. The repetition of the above 
statement by far-right figures can be con-
sidered relevant to their own polarised and 
discriminative rhetoric, however, its utili-
sation by a New Democracy MP illustrates 
the strategic adaptation of far-right polit-
ical rhetoric by the party and once again 
the resurgence of its extreme roots.
The spread of the COVID-19 pandem-
ic in Europe and confirmation of the first 
case of the virus in Greece on 26 February 
2020 led to immigration restrictions, in-
asmuch as the government conflated the 
refugee issue and the pandemic. The exis-
tence of refugee camps since 2015 and the 
threat of the pandemic provide a chance to 
the government to communicate its tough 
migration agenda and its necessity for the 
security of the Greek population. Accord-
ing to the government spokesman, Stelios 
Petsas (2020a):
The confinement of migrants in detention 
centres is necessary, and it is important for lo-
cal societies and our country in general. Coro-
navirus can only be controlled if migrants 
stay in detention centres. It is evident that 
matters such as the coronavirus can be dealt 
with swiftly and effectively in a closed facility, 
and not an anarchic, open facility, which is a 
health time-bomb.
In the same vein, the prime minister, 
Kyria kos Mitsotakis, stated on 27 February 
2020 (Mitsotakis, 2020):
The migration issue has a new dimension, 
given that people from Iran, a country hit by 
coronavirus, are coming to Greece. Our is-
lands that face public health issues need to 
be secured. From today, therefore, our coun-
try cites Regulation 2016/399 of the Europe-
an Commission on border controls under 
Schengen rules, and particularly paragraph 
6, on controls to prevent a threat to public 
health. This means upgrading controls at the 
Greek border to the highest level for the great-
est possible control over the virus’ spread … 
I have already informed the European Com-
mission of this decision, and it must see this 
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as a measure to protect health throughout Eu-
rope, given that Greece’s borders with Turkey, 
North Macedonia and Albania are also the 
external borders of the EU. 
The above extracts illustrate the govern-
ment’s political strategy to justify its strict 
migration policy by comparing the two is-
sues – migration and the pandemic – and 
representing migrants as potential carriers 
of the virus and a threat to public health via 
the Aristotelian fallacy due to consequence8 
or argument as misericordiam,9 which vio-
lates rules 8 and 4, insofar as the argument 
presented by the two politicians is not 
valid or capable of being validated by the 
explication of one or more unexpressed 
premises. Moreover, Petsas’ description of 
the open facilities that were constructed 
on the basis of Syriza’s migration policy as 
anarchic and a “health time-bomb” criti-
cises the previous government by under-
lining its deleterious political decisions via 
the Aristotelian topos of the consequential 
or the topos of the threat of migration (see 
above), which consist of positing a dichot-
omy between two political poles and their 
different migration policies. In addition, 
Mitsotakis’ references to the EU and Eu-
rope’s borders and the stigmatisation of 
Iran and Iranian migrants represent the 
Greek government being responsible for 
European public health, which it secures 
through its restrictive migration policy. 
An argument that is further developed 
through the Aristotelian topos of analogue 
consequences)10 or the DHA topos of re-
8 According to Aristotle (1994, 167b) the fallacy 
due to consequence is used to show that the 
implication is convertible. For instance, it is 
considered that it was raining because the 
ground is wet and when it rains the ground 
becomes wet.
9 As Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 72) explain, 
“an argument consists of unjustifiably ap-
pealing for compassion and empathy in cas-
es where a specific situation of serious diffi-
culties intended to evoke compassion and to 
win an antagonist over to one’s side is fake or 
pretended”.
10 A topos that explains that an argument is de-
rived from analogy in things (Aristotle, 2004, 
B23 1399b).
sponsibility,11 which is here based on the 
logic “if the Greek government is respon-
sible for the national and Europe’s security 
and public health, then the government 
should stop migration and secure Europe-
an borders”.
Another important case study that 
illustrates the government’s emphasis 
on the borders as national and European 
was the tension that was created in the 
Greek-Turkey border region of Evros when 
migrants, supported by the Turkish po-
lice, attempted to cross the Greek border 
in March 2020. As Stelios Petsas (2020b) 
explained in his statement regarding the 
decisions of the Government Council of 
National Security:
Greece is experiencing extraordinary and or-
ganised pressure by mass population move-
ments. These people are attempting to enter 
Greece by using violence, and thus the coun-
try is under an active, serious, extraordinary, 
and asymmetrical threat to its security. For 
this reason, the Greek government announc-
es that the country will upgrade its security to 
the maximum possible level across the coun-
try’s eastern border by strengthening its police 
and military units. Greece will also suspend all 
asylum applications for one month for those 
who enter the country illegally. Greece will 
also request emergency assistance from the 
European Union due to the current extraordi-
nary situation.
By recontextualising the concept of asym-
metrical threat that was used by the US 
authorities during the Cold War and was 
rediscovered to characterise terrorism 
(Stepanova, 2008), the spokesperson fo-
cuses on the danger that Greece is fac-
ing and justifies violence in an attempt 
to defend national security and territory. 
According to Stelios Petsas, state appa-
ratuses, such as the military and the po-
lice, ensure the national safety and the 
11 According to Reisigl and Wodak (2001, p. 78) 
the topos of responsibility “can be sum-
marised by the conditional formula: because 
a state or a group of persons is responsible 
for the emergence of specific problems, it or 
they should act in order to find solutions of 
these problems”.
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Greek government requests “emergency 
assistance from the European Union due 
to the current extraordinary situation.” 
In this way, the Greek government culti-
vates a climate of fear that is also based 
on the topos of the threat of migration 
(see above). In contrast to Antonis Sama-
ras’ rhetoric, which represented migrants 
as invaders in a fallacious and ambiguous 
way, this time the threat becomes real, in-
sofar as the Greek government underlines 
the migration issue and not the conflict 
between the two countries: Greece and 
Turkey. The asymmetric threat definition 
was also shared by far-right figures, such 
as Kyriakos Velopoulos and Ilias Kasidiaris, 
the former spokesperson of Golden Dawn 
and leader of the new extreme right party, 
Greeks for the Fatherland, as an appeal to 
anti-migration and nationalist emotions. 
Hence, in New Democracy’s discourse, the 
refugee issue is linked to national imagi-
naries, sovereignty, securitisation, and mi-
grants through fallacies, and these topoi 
are presented as a severe threat to national 
security and public health. 
5 The enemy at the gates: Talking 
about securitisation and 
sovereignty
Greece faced a refugee crisis in 2015 that 
led to a polarised climate and questioned 
European solidarity (Boukala & Dimitra-
kopoulou, 2018). The then Greek govern-
ment’s (Syriza-led coalition government) 
policy on migration manifested a dese-
curitisation strategy, although it failed to 
produce the anticipated results (Skleparis, 
2018). In contrast, the current New De-
mocracy’s government has constructed 
its migration policy on the basis of secu-
ritisation. Drawing upon Carl Schmitt’s 
(1932) political theory and speech acts,12 
12 Following Austin’s perspective, Balzacq 
(2005, p. 175) explains that the basic idea of 
speech act theory is based on the principle 
that certain statements do more than merely 
describe a given reality and, as such, cannot 
be judged as false or true. Instead, these ut-
terances realise a specific action – they are 
performatives as opposed to constatives that 
the theory of securitisation was developed 
to explain how political elites justify their 
policies in the name of security in a dis-
cursive way (Balzacq, 2005). As Boukala 
(2019) observes, according to McDonald 
(2008, p. 567), securitisation can be de-
fined as “positioning through speech acts 
that are usually announced by political 
leaders and pertains to a particular issue, 
such as a threat to survival, which in turn 
enables emergency measures, with the 
consent of the relevant constituency, and 
the suspension of ‘normal politics’ in deal-
ing with the issue”. According to Rampton, 
Charalampous and Charalampous (2014, 
p. 3) “securitisation refers to ‘existential 
threats’ that mean threats to the very exis-
tence of the state and lead the authorities 
to move from the realm of ordinary politics 
into the realm of exceptional by adopting 
strict measures against the potential dan-
ger”. Hence, securitisation is based on the 
discursive construction of a threat, which 
could lead to the reinforcement of the state 
power while rights could be suspended via 
the “state of exception” (Agamben, 2005). 
Indeed, as Balzacq (2005, p. 179) notes, 
“securitisation is a rule-governed practice, 
the success of which does not necessarily 
depend on the existence of a real threat, 
but on the discursive ability to effectively 
endow a development with such a spe-
cific complexion”. In this vein, security 
is applied as a speech act; it does not al-
ways refer to an existential threat but rep-
resents a threat and claims a specific right 
to use whatever means necessary to fight 
it (Waever, 1995). Security, then, is linked 
to an imagined threat that is developed 
through a speech act utilised by political 
elites and state apparatuses. According to 
Williams (2003, p. 514), what makes a par-
ticular speech act a part of securitisation 
is the reference to “an ‘existential threat,’ 
which calls for extraordinary measures be-
yond the routines and norms of everyday 
politics”. The theory of securitisation and 
the discursive emphasis on a threat domi-
nates New Democracy’s rhetoric on migra-
tion and forms its migration policy on the 
basis of exclusion and national security. It 
simply report states of affairs and are thus 
subject to truth and falsity tests.
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also contributes to the discursive oppo-
sition between ‘us’ and ‘them’, migrants, 
who, as Konstantinos Bogdanos claimed, 
“do not have the same rights as Greeks” 
(To BHMAteam, 2019).
The securitisation framework, espe-
cially its earliest Copenhagen model has 
been criticised as elliptical or narrow, be-
cause it is exclusively focused on speech 
acts and the discourses of dominant 
actors, such as political leaders, and in-
stitutions, i. e., the State (Balzacq, 2005; 
McDonald, 2008; Williams, 2003). I argue 
that the DHA and especially its argumen-
tation strategies contribute to the study 
of the discursive construction of a threat 
and overcome limitations that are relevant 
to the political concepts of securitisation 
theory by emphasising linguistic means 
and their links to power relations and ide-
ology. By presenting the topos of the threat 
of migration and focusing on the fallacious 
arguments used by New Democracy’s fig-
ures, I assume that the issue of national 
security and how it was discursively devel-
oped by current and former prime minis-
ters, government spokespersons and the 
New Democracy MP Konstantinos Bog-
danos has been analysed in a holistic way 
via the DHA that surpasses the limitations 
of speech acts and the “existential threat” 
emphasis. Drawing upon argumentation 
strategies, I attempted to show the juxta-
positions between far-right discourse and 
New Democracy’s rhetoric on migration 
and reveal the strategic resurgence of New 
Democracy’s extreme right roots.
According to Brown (2010, pp. 47–48), 
“[w]e speak of sovereignty today as if we 
know what we mean when we discuss its 
existence, achievement, violation, asser-
tion, jurisdiction, or even waning. Yet sov-
ereignty is an unusually amorphous, elu-
sive, and polysemic term of political life”. 
Hence, sovereignty and borders are inter-
linked, insofar as the borders demonstrate 
the nation-state’s sovereignty (Brown, 
2010). Moreover, borders add an imagi-
nary dimension to sovereignty by creating 
an “imaginative geography” (Said, 1991) 
or a sense of belonging within a common 
territory (Anderson, 2006). Thus, boundar-
ies compose not only geographical limits 
but also a common, national identity and 
a distinction between “us” and “them”. As 
Brown (2010, p. 69) further explains, “to-
day, there is incitement to xenophobic 
nationalism and a call for states to close 
and secure national borders from na-
tion-states’ populations anxious about the 
migration ‘threat’”.
In this climate of insecurity and xe-
nophobia, closing borders is a practice of 
state protectionism or a state of exception 
(Agamben, 1998, 2005) that seeks to re-
duce the population’s insecurity by keep-
ing the “threat” outside national borders, 
thus validating the nation-state’s juridical 
rules. Wall functions as a symbolic means 
that signifies borders and the opposi-
tion between ‘us’, inside the borders, and 
‘them’, who are outside and need to be 
blocked. Walls draw upon the concept of 
nation-state sovereignty and the demarca-
tion of nation-state boundaries. As Brown 
(2010, p. 40) further explicates, “walls de-
fining or defending political entities have 
shaped collective and individual identity 
within as they aimed to block penetration 
from without”. Thus, New Democracy’s 
emphasis on invasion and asymmetric 
warfare legitimises the nation-state’s strat-
egy of exclusion / inclusion and provides a 
fallacy of protection from an alien danger 
that threatens national security and public 
health. 
Sovereignty, border controls, and the 
discursive construction of a common en-
emy contribute to the acceptance of state 
politics which, in the case of New Democ-
racy’s rhetoric on the refugee issue, could 
be described as a “state of exception” 
(Agamben, 2005) that justifies a tough mi-
gration policy via argumentative schemes 
presented as topoi and fallacies and the 
normalisation of far-right discourse.
6 Conclusion
“Benefits should be provided for children 
born by Greek parents only” (Newsroom 
iefimerida, 2019) announced Konstansti-
nos Kyranakis, a New Democracy MP and 
former president of the Youth of the Euro-
pean People’s Party. A statement empha-
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sised New Democracy’s turn to national-
ism and it would not have been a paradox 
if it were stated by a member of political 
parties that are on the far-right of the 
Greek political spectrum.
By emphasising argumentative sche-
mes such as Aristotelian topoi and fal-
lacies through the prism of the DHA, this 
article offers insights into the narrative 
persuasion adopted by New Democra-
cy to legitimise its strict migration policy. 
By equilibrating democracy and human 
rights, and absolutism and racism within 
the ambiguous limits of a “state of excep-
tion”, Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ government is 
seeking a position on the right of New De-
mocracy’s centrism, insofar as it shares a 
far-right rhetoric. Securitisation and the 
discursive construction of migration as an 
existential threat dominate the discourses 
of the political figures under analysis and 
lead to a dichotomy between an external 
and dangerous “them” and a “we” under 
threat. Nation-state imaginaries and strat-
egies of exclusion are applied via specific 
fallacies and topoi that are used by New 
Democracy figures to persuade their au-
dience of the validity of their arguments. 
By utilising the DHA and emphasising ar-
gumentation strategies, I underline micro 
strategies of securitisation and surveil-
lance (Bigo, 2006) that were used by the 
current government to justify its migration 
policy. I also assume that the usage of far-
right rhetoric due to the migration issue 
by the New Democracy leaderships and 
members is not accidental, quite to the 
contrary it is an aporia of the extreme right 
values of the party that revived during the 
electoral rise of the left and Syriza’s coa-
lition government in 2015. Far-right dis-
courses and attitudes shape New Democ-
racy’s political strategy and are expressed 
via the topos of threat of migration and in 
the name of Greek people’s safety.
To conclude, “the politics of fear” 
(Wodak, 2015) is used by political leaders 
to disseminate ambiguous political de-
cisions at critical times and is linked to 
the mainstreaming of far-right discours-
es and strategies. Following Wodak’s view 
and the multiple dimensions of the DHA, 
I have shed light on the resurgence of the 
far-right values of the conservative New 
Democracy by examining, in depth, its 
members’ discourses on the migration is-
sue and the national security that illustrate 
the revival of the party’s extreme voices as 
an aporia of the party’s de-demonisation 
of its extreme ideological roots.
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